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Events of the past quarter  century have renewed  the interest 
of economic historians  in major financial disturbances.  The study 
of financial  crises was common  before World War  II, but for the 
next quarter century little  fresh work was done in the area.. The 
chief exception was J. K. Galbraithls  The Great Crash,  1929 (1954). 
Then came M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz's Monetarv  Historv of the 
United States,  1867-1960  (1963) with its bold analysis  of the  great 
contraction  of 1929-1933.  Just  as that'analysis  was gaining  the 
attention  of economic  historians,  the United  States  began to 
experience  credit  crunches,  steeply  rising  interest  rates, bank 
failures, debt crises, and a host of other financial  disturbances 
the likes of which had not been seen for a good long time.  Soon C. 
P. Kindleberger's  widely read book, Ma ia  3 
History of Financial Crises  (1978) reminded economic historians  and 
others of the long history  of such disturbances. 
My assignment here, from H. Minsky, is to review what economic 
historians,  especially  in recent years, have had to say about 
financial disturbances  and depressions.  I inferred  from 
discussions  with  Prof. Minsky  and from some familiarity  with  his 
own work that he very much wanted to tie together the two concepts, 
financial disturbance  and depression.  The I*It"  in his book,  Can 
'lItI  Haooen  Aaain  (1982) is, it will be recalled,  a Great 2. 
Depression.  In Minsky's  work,  a Great Depression  results  from a 
debt deflation  or, in other words,  from an extreme  form  of the 
financial  instability  that he and others regard  as inherent  in a 
capitalist  economic  system. 
As I tackled  the assignment  I discovered  that in recent years 
economic  historians,  for all their  renewed  interest  in financial 
crises, have not had a great deal to say, with the exceptionof  the 
llItlt  of 1929-1933,  about crises and denressions.  Most  of the 
recent work has been  concerned  with the causes  and nature  of 
financial  crises  rather than with their aftermaths  or economic 
consequences.  Even Kindleberger  (1978), who compares  financial 
crises dating  from the 1720s to the 1970s with  one another,  says 
little about  the  distinction  between crises that led to depressions 
and those that did not.  More  recently,  two colleagues  and I 
(Wilson, Sylla,  and Jones,  1990), to help celebrate  the  first 
anniversary  of the  1987 crash,  studied the U.S.  crises  under  the 
National Banking System, 1863-1914, and  the  1929 and 1987 crashes; 
like Kindleberger  and others, we drew no distinction  between  the 
ones associated  with  depressions  and the others. 
In U.S.history,  financial crises are commonly dated  in 1819, 
1837, 1857, 1873,  sometimes  in 1884 and 1890, and in 1893,  1907, 
and 1929-1933.  Not all of these  crises were  connected  with or 
followed by protracted  depressions.  But 1837, 1873,  1893,  1929, 
and possibly  1819 fall into that category.  The years  1837-1843, 
1873-1879,  1893-1897,  and 1929-1933  were post crisis  periods  of 
depression  by nearly all accounts,  and the crisis  of 1819  fell in . 
3. 
a period  of postwar  depression  lasting  from 1815 to 1821.  In 
contrast, after the crises of 1857, 1884, 1890 (assuming it was  not 
part of the  larger crisis that also included  1893-1897,  an 
assumption  I would challenge),  1907, and the stock market crash of 
1987, there were brief  lulls before  recovery.  No protracted 
depressions  resulted. 
What causes some crises and not others to lead to depressions? 
Are the seeds of depression planted  in the period  leading up to the 
financial disturbance?  This might have been the case after periods 
of speculative  manias  and debt creation,  from which,  after  the 
financial  crisis,  many months  or years of gradual  liquidation 
followed.  Or is the depression more a result of responses made to 
the financial  disturbance  after  it occurs?  This might  depend  on 
the presence  or absence of an effective  lender  of last resort. 
With these questions  in mind, I here examine the record regarding 
the nineteenth-century  U.S. crises  that were  followed  by 
depressions.  I can add little to what is now generally  known, well 
beyond  the domain  of economic historians,  about  1929-1933.  If 
there is any problem with the extensive modern  discussion  of that 
crisis  and depression,  it lies in the tendency  to treat  it as 
unique  rather  than merely the last in a sequence  of similar 
occurrences  stretching  back into history.  I proceed 
chronologically. 
The Disturbance  of 1819 
The financial panic of 1819 came in the middle  of what Thorpe . 
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in Business Annals (1926)  described as a generally depressed period 
following the War of 1812.  (There are no reliable annual GNP data 
for the nineteenth century; I refer to Thorpe's qualitative 
descriptions of within-year and year-to-year changes in economic 
conditions as the best guides available for that era.)  Although 
the postwar period may in some sense have been depressed--see the 
Appendix for Thorpe's descriptions--there is evidence of 
\ 
considerable speculation in it.  Between 1811 and 1818, the number 
of chartered banks nearly tripled, and  bank capital increased about 
2 l/2 times.  Public land sales increased from about half a million 
acres per year before the war, to 3 l/2 million acres in 1818. 
During the war the federal debt soared.  Foreign capital inflows 
average $27 million per year during 1816-1819,  while in the 4 to 5 
year periods before and after 1816-1819, the annual averages were 
close  to zero. 
The 1819 financial panic proper appears to have been caused by 
the newly organized Second Bank of the United States.  According to 
Kindleberger (1978. p. 124), the Bank 
precipitated the panic by having its branches call on state 
banks to redeem large balances and notes held by the Second 
Bank.  The purpose was to assemble $4 million in specie to 
repay the borrowing undertaken in  Europe in 1803 to effect  the 
Louisiana purchase.  But the Second Bank itself was a 
bubble.... It was run by greedy and corrupt directors who 
accepted promissory notes in payment of stock, registered 
stock in different names to get around the laws limiting 
concentration of ownership, voted loans on the security of 
bank stock, permitted other loans without collateral,,  and 
allowed accounts to be overdrawn. 
In addition to pressuring the state banks to contract, the Second 
Bank itself contracted sharply in order to  accumulate the gold 5. 
-needed  to pay the government's 
circulation  had risen  from $13 
debt in Europe.  Its deposits  and 
to $21 million,  1817 to 1818, and 
then  fell to $12 and $10 million  in 1819 and 1820  (Historical 
Statistics,  1976, p. 1018).  According  to Peter Ternin's  estimates, 
first available  for the year  1820, the U.S. money  stock  in that 
year was  $85 million,  so the contraction  from 1818 to 1819 was 
relatively  large.  Prices fell 28 percent  from 1819 to 182Q.  The 
Second Bank was obviously the antithesis of a lender of last resort 
in this crisis.  Rocked by scandal, the Bank's president,  William 
Jones, was forced to resign in the midst of the financial  crisis, 
leaving it to his successor, Langdon Cheves, to pick up the pieces. 
In the wake of the panic, the federal government--a  creditor 
in land sales--  and many  state governments  enacted  a variety  of 
debtor relief measures  (Rothbard, 1962).  The depression  appears to 
have run its course by 1821. 
The Disturbances  and Denression  of 1837-1843 
The 1837-1843  crisis was  international  in scope,  in part 
because  two of the main  items of U.S. speculation,  cotton  and 
securities,  were  sold extensively  in Europe.  Annual  land sales,  ’ 
primarily  cotton  land in the South,  soared ten-fold  between  1830 
and 1837.  Much of this was financed by banks, which nearly doubled 
in number during the same period, while the money stock rose nearly 
2 l/2 fold (Temin, 1969, p.71).  The land and banking bubble burst 
in 1837 after the Bank of England  contracted.  But speculation 
continued--possibly  even increased--in  securities,  mostly  the 6. 
bonded debt of state  governments  seeking money  for internal 
improvement  projects  that  likely would  have turned  out to be bad 
investments  even  if the collapse  into depression-had  not taken 
place.  State bond issues totaled $27 million  in the 182Os, rose to 
$40 million  in 1830-1835, and further to $108 million  in 1835-1838 
(Studensky, 1930, p. 8).  Mira Wilkins  (1989, pp.  50-51)  reports 
that $50 million  of U.S. securities were held abroad  in 1833,,  and 
$200 million  in 1840. 
The Second  Bank, having  been emasculated  by Jacksonian 
politics,  was  in no position  to act as a lender of last resort  in 
1837.  Instead,  rechartered  in 1836 as a Pennsylvania  state bank, 
it attempted to engage in profitable public service by speculating 
in cotton and state debts.  It enjoyed  some success  in these 
ventures  in 1838-1839,  but, bloated with  securities  it could  not 
sell, it had to close  its doors  forever  in 1841.  By then  many 
states had defaulted  on their debts and some of these  debts were 
actually repudiated.  Foreign lending to the United States came to 
a screeching  halt. 
Temin  (1969, ch. 5) argues that the period  1839-1843 .was  a 
deflation rather than a depression.  Although real investment  fell 
sharply,  real consumption  and GNP, by his calculations,  actually 
increased  in this  "depression."  Since the U.S. economy  was still 
largely agricultural,  he may be correct  that the contraction  was 
more nominal than real, even though the data are imprecise.  But in 
the commercial  and industrial components of the economy,  the small 
but dynamic  sectors,  and in government  finances at the state  and . 
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federal levels,  it appears that there was a severe and protracted 
depression. 
The Disturbances  and Deoression  of 1873-1879 
Like 1837-1843,  the period  1873-1879  appears  to have been  a 
t'growth  IV  depression,  with  steeply  falling prices  and rapidly 
increasing  real output.  Or at least the period  1867-1879  was 
\ 
(Friedman and Schwartz,  1963, ch. 2).  If the period  is divided 
into pre- and post crisis segments,  the years from 1867  (or 1868) 
to 1872  (or 1873) show increasing  trends  in money,  railroad 
construction,  and capital  inflows.  The years from 1873, in 
contrast,  indicate flat or declining  trends in these categories. 
Even prices, which fell throughout,  fell considerably  faster after 
the 1873 financial  crisis.  Federal  debt, with a couple  o,f 
exceptions,  fell each year, but much more was retired before  1873 
than after  (see Appendix). 
Speculation  in this, the gilded age, centered on railroads  and 
railroad  securities,  but also appeared  in gold  (the 1869 corner, 
for example)  and in urban  land, especially  in Chicago 
(Kindleberger,  1990).  More  railway mileage  was constructed  in 
1868-1873 than had been built  in the entire antebellum  era.  Some 
of it was built  ahead of demand.  Where there was demand  for 
railway services,  the Granger  movement  attacked  the railways' 
freight rates.  As in the 183Os, it became  increasingly  difficult 
to market  securities  in Europe,  and this ultimately  led to Jay 
Cooke's  failure  in September  1873, the central event  that marked 8. 
the financial panic and ushered  in the depression. p There was, as 
Kindleberger  (1978) notes, no lender of last resort.  In this era, 
in a perverse  way the U.S. Treasury  acted much as the Second  Bank 
had done  in 1819 and the 1830s.  The Treasury  supplied  a lot of 
cash to financial markets through debt retirement during the period 
of speculation  up to the financial  panic,  and then  as the 
depression  unfolded  it sought  to keep its cash and build  up its  \ 
stock of gold for purposes  of resuming the gold standard  at prewar 
parity. 
Peter Temin  (1989), after a long, scholarly debate concerning 
"It,  "in which he was one of the major participants,  argues that the 
cause of the Great  Depression  was  adherence  to the pre-1914  gold 
standard when,  after and 
longer appropriate.  This 
to economic policy  in all 
course which  a number  of 
One could tell a similar 
1860s and 1870s. 
as a result  of World War  I, it was no 
adherence  imparted a deflationary  course 
the major countries  during  the 192Os, a 
them  continued  to follow  into the 1930s. 
story  about U.S. policy  during  the late 
The Disturbances  of the 1890s 
Many  writers  (going  back  to  Lauck,  1907,  if  not  earlier) 
ascribe  the panic  of 1893 entirely  to the U.S.  silver  situation, 
which,  it is said,  caused  both  Americans  and  foreigners  to doubt 
that the United  States would be able to maintain  its commitment  to 
the gold  standard.  This  led to a run on the U.S.  gold  stock.  I 
tend  to agree  more  with  Sprague,  who  formed  his  judgment  on  the 
basis  of an exhaustive  comparative  study  of the  financial  crises 
that occurred  under  the National  Banking  System.  Sprague  (1910, 
PP. 154-55) wrote  of 1893: . 
The crisis  itself was a result of complex  causes 
the monetary  situation was by no means certainly 
important.  This is especially  true of the causes 
years of depression which  followed its outbreak.  . 
among which 
the most 
of the long 
Among these 
causes may be mentioned  unremunative  prices  ror agricultural 
staples,  and the heavy  load of farm mortgage  indebtedness; 
also railway  receiverships  which were due to oversanguine 
estimates  of the future and reckless  financing  of the wildest 
sort.  Even the unsatisfactory  banking position  at the  time of 
the crisis  seems to have ben  far less a product  of monetary 
conditions  that has usually  been supposed. 
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In many ways the 1890s are similar to the 1870s.  Before 1890 
\ 
or 1891, as before 1872 or 1873, prices were relatively  stable, the 
money stock grew rapidly, federal debt retirement  was increasing, 
railway  building  was rapid  (1887 being the all-time  peak year), 
land settlement  was extensive,  and foreign capital  inflows were 
large  (see Appendix).  These trends  reversed  themselves  in the 
early 189Os, after the Baring crisis in Britain, which had a strong 
contracting  effect on New York financial markets.  The speculative 
unwinding began then.  The connection  of the crisis of 1890 to the 
full-fledged  panic  of 1893 was masked  by llprosperityl'  in 1892, 
which seems mostly  to have been due to bumper U.S.  crops and poor 
European  crops,  and also, to be sure, by the emerging  silver 
problems.  The European crisis reduced the flow of capital to the 
United  States,  and Ameican  securities  began to be repatriated. 
Perhaps wisely,  for during the next few years an estimated  one 
fourth to one third of U.S. railway mileage  passed  into 
receiverships.  It seems unlikely that  this  was a result of silver 
agitation.  Given the competitively  induced overbuilding  of 
railways, the roads would have had difficulties  in servicing their 
debts without  silver problems  and without  a depression. 10. 
As in 1873, there was no lender of last resort when the panic 
broke  out in 1893.  Kindleberger  (1978, p. 259),  in his stylized 
outline  of financial  crises,  lists repeal  of the  1890 Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act in 
of last resort.  This 
protect the Treasury's 
supposes that a lender 
'of  a financial panic. 
August,  1893, under the category  of lender 
is odd.  The Act was repealed  in order to 
gold reserve, which is hardly the action one 
of last resort should undertake  in the midst 
\ 
Indeed, protecting  the gold reserve was the 
order of the day for the next few years of depression,  again as in 
the  1870s. 
Although the depressions  of 1837-1843  and 1873-1879 may have 
been much worse in nominal than in real terms,  it does appear that 
the depression  of the 1890s was a true  economic  contraction. 
Estimates  of unemployment  range  from 12 to 18 percent  between 
1893 and 1897  (Lebergott 1964, p.522:  Romer  1986, p.31). 
Conclusions 
What lessons may be drawn from this brief and limited survey 
of U.S. financial disturbances  and depressions  in the last century? 
On the question of whether  the characteristics  of the speculative 
l@maniastl  that preceded nearly all financial crises determined which 
crises would  lead to depressions,  I believe  that the answer  is 
affirmative.  Disregarding  the 1819 episode, which  one may doubt 
led to a deep and protracted  depression  such as those of the 183Os, 
187Os, and 189Os, it does appear that in each of the latter three 
cases speculation  took place on a number  of fronts simultaneously . 
.  ’ 
11. 
and that at least some of these fronts were unlikely  to have panned 
out financially  even if financial  disturbance  and depression  had 
not ensued. 
In the 1830s the high price of cotton before the panic was not 
sustainable,  and most internal improvement projects  of the states 
were not destined  to produce normal  investment  returns  with or 
without  a depression.  In the 1870s and the 189Os,  speculdt,ive 
euphorias  and competitive  necessities  led to railroad  building 
ahead of demand,  with  likely adverse  investment  results  even if 
depressions  had not subsequently  materialized. 
What about the three pre-1914  instances  (again, excluding 
1819) of financial disturbances  that did not lead to depression? 
In 1857, according  to Calomiris  and Schweikart  (1990), the 
distressed  assets were localized  (being the securities  of a few 
western railroads), and the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, 
whose failure marked that panic just as Jay Cooke's  failure marked 
1873, happened  to hold a large portfolio  of those assets.  In 1857 
there was nothing  like the general  speculative  movement  involving 
several  classes  of assets that seems to have been the 
characteristic  of financial disturbance-depression  scenarios. 
Much the same can be said of the panic  of 1884, which was 
confined mostly  to the financial markets  of New York City and was 
inspired,  if that  is the right word, by the failures  of a few 
prominent  financial houses including that of former president U. s. 
Grant.  In 1907, a more serious panic with  national  consequences 12. 
and long-term  ramifications,  it was centered  in the  trust 
companies.  Speculation  was not rampant  in several  areas  at once. 
So there  do appear  to be differences  between  the events 
leading up to a financial  disturbance  that then  leads  to a 
depression  and the events that lead to a disturbance  that does not 
lead to a depression.  Could this be generalized, 
the period after  1914? 
one wonders,  to 
Since at least some depressions were avoided  in the aftermath 
of financial  disturbances,  one also wonders whether  the others 
might also have been avoided.  This raises the issue of the lender 
of last resort.  It is interesting,  I think, to note that in nearly 
all of the U.S. cases of major financial disturbances,  namely  1837, 
1857, 1873, 1884,  1890,  1893, and 1907, there was  present  no 
designated  lender of last resort.  During the era of the two Banks 
of the United  States,  1791-1811 and 1816-1836, there was only one 
major disturbance,  in 1819, and it came  in an already  depressed 
period when the Second  Bank, by consensus,  was both  new, poorly 
managed,  and behaved  very much the opposite  of the way  a true 
lender of last resort would have behaved. 
that this would  happen. 
From 1914 to the present,  the Federal 
It was not the last time 
Reserve  era, there  has 
been only one  instance  of financial  disturbance  followed  by 
protracted depression.  The Fed's role therein, ever since Friedman 
and Schwartz  (1963), has been prominently  noted  in most 
discussions.  It would  be interesting  to know how many  potential 
financial disturbances  between  1791 and  1811, between  1820 and 13. 
1836, and between 1914 and the present were averted by timely 
central bank action.  But that is to know why what did not happen 
did not happen, a task far more difficult than the already quite 
difficult one of determining  why what did happen happened.  On the 
whole, however, the evidence of two centuries tends to support those 
who argue that the presence of a lender of last resort tends to 
minimize the adverse effects of financial  disturbances, if,  not 
actually avoid them altogether. 
Lastly, I think that Peter Temin's point about 1929-1933, 
namely that a depression can be caused by an inflexible and even 
blind attachment to some past policy prescription, such as the gold 
standard at old parities, after circumstances  have made it outmoded 
and dangerous, has precedents in the U.S. depressions before World 
War I. 14. 
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